Liability laws are a very attractive policy instrument in a market economy for a number of reasons. If an individual agent inflicts a damage on another party, liability rules allow the damage costs to be attributed to the agent who caused the damage. The originator of a damage will be forced to pay, and he will not be able to transplant some of the social costs of his action on someone else. Liability will tend to bring private and social costs into line. In principle, therefore, liability is an efficient social institution for dealing with other and third-party damages.
generates additional problems if a specific use of the environment is encumbered with risk or uncertainty.
The notion of risk implies that the consequences of a decision cannot be determined in a clear-cut way for the acting agent due to inadequate information, for instance, on future events. The consequences of an action are therefore 'uncertain'. Risk can be interpreted as a deviation in either direction from an expected result, i.e. the mathematical variance in the random variable considered plausible by the decision-maker. According to Knight (1921 ) , risk is to be interpreted as a measurable, i.e. quantifiable, variable. Economic agents can assign probabilities to events happening in the world in the future. Many authors require that probabilities should be based on an empirical frequency analysis so that they acquire an objective or statistical character. In this interpretation, we are concerned with a narrow concept of risk. Uncertainty, on the other hand, may imply that no probability can be stated or deduced from reality to determine the state of the world, in other words that probability can only be stated subjectively (or not at all), and not objectively. References in this chapter are to this broader risk concept, unless otherwise indicated.
An important distinction for our analysis is between individual and social risks. Individual risks refer to individual subsystems of the national economy, whereas social risks relate to society as a whole. We can only speak of social risks if the random variable relates to public goods (or merit goods). The quality of the environment constitutes such a public good. Environmental pollution which is not known exactly in advance, can therefore be interpreted as a social risk.
Negative external effects of economic activities on the environment are loaded with risks for a number of reasons.
Pollutants, such as persistent micropollutants, accumulate over a lengthy period of time in the environment's media, in a manner which is often not foreseeable (accumulation risk). One example of this long-term effect is DDT, now banned in all industrialized countries, becoming concentrated in the body's fatty tissue via the food chain: 0.000003 parts per million were measured in the water in Long Island Sound, New York; the concentration in zooplankton, whose oils absorb DDT, is 0.04, more than 1000 times stronger. The measurement recorded for small fish in the same water was 0.5, for large fish 2.0 and in fish-eating cormorants 25.0 ppm (Siebert, 197 3, p. 19) . Other examples include the sedimentation of heavy metals in rivers and pollutants becoming trapped in the soil. Pollutants interact in the environment's media and between different environmental media (risk of synergism). We are not yet fully familiar with such synergisms as the formation of ozone in the troposphere. A characteristic feature of several such interdependences is their extremely slow development. For instance, it takes 20 years or more for the highly stable freon from our aerosol sprays to reach the ozone layer and interact with the ozone under the influence of sunlight. Besides accumulation and syner-gisms, the spatial transportation of pollutants by environmental systems is plagued by uncertainty insofar as existing calculations of their spread do not suitably reflect the actual situation. Spreading in atmospheric systems, ground-water systems, or diffusion along food chains (diffusion risk) , are the cases in question here.
In addition to the accumulation of pollutants and the phenomenon of interaction, the incidence of emissions and pollutants ambient in the environment remain, in part, unknown (damage risk) . Pollution such as that affecting our forests only becomes evident after a lengthy period of time. Nitrate enrichment of the groundwater or the accumulation of pollutants in the soil likewise only become apparent after a certain time lapse. The extent of the pollution remains unknown ex ante, and may deviate from a mean value in either direction.
Particular features which may play an important role in the uncertainty of environmental pollution are threshold effects and irreversibilities. In other words, damages frequently only become evident once certain thresholds' are passed, causing environmental systems to pass the 'point of no return'. Such threshold effects may ultimately prove to be irreversible: the original state of the environment cannot be re-established, even at immense cost or after laborious effort (irreversibility risk), for instance when a species of animal or plant becomes extinct.
Liability in a Semi-Coasean World
As a rule, using the environment as a public consumption good involves social risks; consequently, the problem arises by which institutional mechanism social risks can be evaluated. Using the environment as a receptacle of wastes, i.e. as a private good, may involve private risks. The risk characteristic of environmental damage gives rise to the question of how environmental risks influence the desired environmental quality, how environmental risks can be limited, and how the social risks of environmental utilization should be signalled to the sub-systems of society, for instance those causing pollution. Is liability law an appropriate institutional arrangement to allocate risks and the costs of risks reduction?
As an extreme theoretical framework of reference, we can consider a situation where the problem of free-riders using the environment is non-existent and exclusive property rights along the lines of the Coase theorem ( 1960) apply. Then in a world with one polluter and one pollutee and with negligible transaction costs, optimal environmental quality is attained by a bargaining process. A bargaining solution internalizes risk.
If future environmental pollution is to be interpreted as a risk in the narrower sense and if polluter and pollutee have an identical risk preference, these measurable stochastic environmental states are converted ex ante into deterministic values. Environmental risks are fully anticipated, resulting in optimum environmental allocation which appropriately takes quantifiable risks into account.
If clearly-defined liability rules for utilizing the environment exist, the polluter bears the costs of abatement and compensation payments for damage caused to the environment. Even when environmental pollution only occurs at a point in the future, the polluter is held unequivocally responsible for the pollution. If clearlydefined rules of liability are applied, the polluter will anticipate the pollution expected in the future, and make an effort to avoid causing emissions and pollution. It is then in the polluter's very own interest to prevent environmental pollution. Strict adherence to the 'polluter pays' principle ensures that the principle of prevention is observed. In an ideal institutional arrangement, the polluter behaves as if he were the victim himself (Adams, 1986, p.144) .
Transaction Costs, Incentives and Liability
In the semi-Coasean world of the previous section, transaction costs are not explicitly taken into account. Transaction costs become especially relevant in the context of persistent micropollutants. With transaction costs, a decentralized application of liability laws will give rise to the following problems.
Legal Costs. Liability law will attribute social costs only ex post. With a well functioning institutional mechanism, ex post allocation of social costs to the polluter will be anticipated and correctly internalized ex ante. If, however, social costs are only allocated with a considerable time lag, the property of efficiency is impaired. Liability law involves the legal process. Especially in the case of continuously occurring emissions, for instance from production, the transaction costs of the legal system tend to be high. It is the characteristics of a market economy that competing uses are not decided by bureaucracies and courts but by markets. The environmental problem is a scarcity problem and, consequently, we should attempt to introduce markets. There is the danger that liability law, although establishing insurance markets, increases the role of non-market mechanisms of allocation.
Identifying the Polluter. Liability rules require that the polluter can be identified without doubt. Here, however, serious problems arise. There may be many polluters; moreover the potential cause of a damage may stem from different pollutants. Secondly, damage is caused by pollutants ambient in the environment; it is difficult to associate pollutants ambient in the environment to emissions. Thirdly, damages only occur with considerable time lags.
These arguments suggest that, in the case of many polluters and many pollutants, liability rules have to allow an attribution of damages to polluters using statistical probabilities. A problem of long-run damages is that firms only have limited assets and that they may change their legal status or may even cease to exist. It is an open question as to what extent liability laws define exit conditions for firms.
The Extent of Damage. Pollution will not only cause a damage for a specific pollutee, but for a number of pollutees. Here, the problem arises as to whether the damage is to be evaluated individually or by some method of aggregation. Legally and constitutionally, the problem arises as to who has the right to go to court and whether a collective court action is allowed. Besides a damage for more than one person, ecological damages may arise that are not particular to a specific person, at least not today. Liability laws must find a way to account for ecological damages. Moreover, the individuals using the environment as a public consumption good may behave as a free rider when asked to reveal their 'true' preferences and their willingness to pay.
Strategic Behavior of the Polluter. The individual polluter has the option not to provide all relevant information faithfully. The policy-maker devising an institutional setting does not have access to the same information as the individual polluter. Information between principal and agent is distributed asymmetrically. It is in the interest of the polluter to play down his or her role in causing environmental pollution. It can be assumed that the polluter has better information on abatement costs; the principal as a representative of the pollutees is supposed to have better information on marginal damage. The situation therefore boils down to finding such institutional arrangements of risk allocation as will avoid distorting information and fending off the approach of using the environment as a recipient for waste free of charge. The institutional arrangement must be fit to transform stochastic into deterministic variables. If the polluter has the option to behave strategically, environmental quality targets are not correctly signalled to the subsystems of an economy.
Incentives for Optimal Case. The problem of liability law is to find an institutional setting in which the polluter takes optimal care -as if he were the pollutee (accounting for differences in tastes and economic conditions between polluter and pollutee ). The incentive system must prevent moral hazard problems, both with respect to providing information and with respect to abatement behaviour.
Forms of Liability and Incentives.
The behaviour of the polluter depends on the forms of liability.
Strict liability implies that parties have to pay damages irrespective of their negligence. Then, they have an incentive to consider all potential harm. Negligence rules require a prescribed level of 'due' care, and a party is held liable if due care has not been applied. Liability with standards only refers to emissions surpassing a standard. In this case, the individual polluter only is liable for pollution beyond the standard. Limits of liability may arise from legal statutes or from the liable assets of the firm. Such limits represent an upper bound on the care taken.
Burden of Proof
The 'burden of proof' is an important aspect of liability law. In the case of strict liability, the burden of proof is with the polluter. He therefore has to carry the transaction costs. In the case of negligence, the government or the pollutee have the burden of proof.
Insurance
Markets. An important ingredient of liability law is that an insurance market will actually develop. Then incentives will be introduced into the economic system to prevent pollutants and damages, and with efficient insurance markets, technological information will come to the fore. If environmental damages cannot be attributed to the individual polluter, if the diffusion and the accumulation of pollutants over time are not clearly traceable and if institutional substitutes to specify causality cannot be developed, insurance firms may be reluctant to take over environmental risks. It is a prerequisite for establishing an insurance market that risks can be calculated and that stochastic variables can be transformed into deterministic values. 'Creeping' damages (Allmiihlichkeitsschiiden) that only develop over time, and damages of which a statistical mean cannot be determined, do not represent a relevant basis for the insurance industry. These damages are not ensurable. Another aspect of insurability is that damages are not too specific so that risk can be spread by insurance over many cases. Yet another issue is that the risk to which a polluter is exposed is limited by the assets of a firm or other institutional restraints.
The Japanese Solution. Liability issues have the systematic difficulty that there is only a statistical relationship between emissions and damages. One method of solving the problem of the responsibility of a specific polluter in practice is simply by determining the level of emissions of individual sources, but not the actual damages. This approach is adopted in the environmental compensation principle applied in Japan. Legislation of 1973 requires that compensation is paid for certain environmental illnesses according to the severity of the disorder. Damages are not allocated on a causal basis to the pulluter. Companies pay a levy into a fund on the basis of their emissions. Those entitled to payments include, for instance, persons who live in a region where a significant, statistical relationship between air pollution and specific illnesses has been established.
Liability and Other Policy Instruments
One important aspect is how liability law can be integrated into the institutional arrangements of other policy instruments such as emission taxes, discharge permits, or regulation.
Consider a representive firm with a continuous flow of emissions that it can abate with a cost function C( S'), where S' are reduced emissions. Let a be the probability of an accident with damageD with 0 < a(S') < 1, a'(S') < 0. The risk-neutral firm can reduce the probability of a damage. 2 The firm minimizes (Shavell, 1984, p. 2 72) .
so that optimal abatement is given by
which implicitly defines optimal abatement as a function of D, S'(D), where S' increases with D. Figure 20 .1 shows potential damage D and optimal reduction of given emissions OS. Optimal reduction of emissions increases with damage (Curve SB). Note that curve SB depends on the institutional setting: if liability cannot be enforced, the ccurve shifts upward.
If the assets of the firm place an upper limit on liability, the effort of the polluter will be reduced to a curve DEF where OA is determined by the assets of the firm. The assets of the firm place an upper limit on the effort curve and shift it upward relative to the optimal abatement case (Shavell, 1984, p.274) . For a given potential damage, less abatement is undertaken.
Instead of liability, an emission standard SS' can be established to limit the quantity of emissions. Such a standard, however, presupposes that the firms to be regulated are rather homogeneous and are clustered around a potential damage XY. If such a distribution exists, a mean of permissible emissions can be defined (if information on the clustering is available). Of course, an emission tax yielding SS' or emission rights, may be applied instead. These price instruments have the advantage of stimulating technological progress in abatement. Environmental policy may use both a standard and liability law. Beyond the standard, liability law applies where the vertical branch EF is determined by the assets of the firm. Figure 20 .1 may also be interpreted with respect to product norms where SS' represents a product norm and DEF represents pollutants being reduced from products.
. . 
Environmental Liability and the Risk of Degradation
If we move away from the semi-Coasean world allowing for transaction costs and limited information of the environmental policy market, the problem arises as to which environmental quality target is set in a world of uncertainty and how a quality target loaded with uncertainty can be signalled to the subsystems of an economy.
When future environmental quality is uncertain, risk allocation relates to two different problems: who will bear the risk of environmental degradation, and who will bear the additional costs of abatement if there is a decline in environmental quality? The answer to these questions varies according to the approach to environmental policy.
When the environment is used free of charge, the pollutee (the general public) bears the environmental risks; there is no incentive to abate or prevent pollution, i.e. the costs of abatement are not attributed to the polluter. The other extreme of environmental policy, the principle of the common burden, implies that the government bears the costs of environmental risks because abatement of unexpected environmental pollution must be financed by the government. The government also bears the costs of correcting environmental risks if environmental policy follows a licensing approach according to the state of the art. This is because, in such a policy approach, uncertain effects of the environment in the future cannot normally be blamed on the polluters. The government may then be forced to subsidize abatement. Only if precautionary measures have been taken in the form of a preventive environmental policy, can the government succeed in passing on all environmental risks to the polluter. With emission taxes and transferable emission rights, it may be easier to signal new and unexpected scarcities.
If environmental policy is to avoid the responsibility for environmental risks falling to the government, it is essential for future environmental risks to be anticipated and built into current scarcity prices. The principle of preventive environmental policy means that, ideally, pollution must be prevented (O'Riordan, 1985; Rehbinder, 1985; Simonis, 1984 ) . Environmental policy must set incentives before problems evolve. The risk of future environmental pollution is of particular significance where the environmental pollution can no longer be cleaned up by future generations at any expense (irreversibility). On the other hand, if environmental pollution is reversible, preventive policy only becomes an attractive course of action if subsequent costs of cleaning up are greater than the current costs of avoiding pollution.
Liability and the Casuistry of the Environmental Problem
Environmental policy approaches to persistent pollutants very much depend on the specific environmental problem at hand. It is therefore promising to develop the casuistry of the environmental problem of persistent pollutants and to discuss the role of liability law in the different cases. Then the following cases have to be distinguished (Siebert, 1987a, p. 19) .
Continuously Arising Emissions in Production.
In this case, licensing (air-quality management) and emission taxes (water-quality management) have been applied. Transferable emissions rights proposed by economists have been used in the 'bubble concept'.
Licensing processes enable the government to lay down the maximum permissible level of persistent emissions. In that approach, the government has to control individual stacks. This method is a typical means of air-quality management in many countries (Federal Republic of Germany, U.S.A.). Companies are normally required to apply state-of-the-art abatement technologies. Permits are issued for as long as the environmental quality in any particular region does not violate the legal limits of ambient quality. Yet this requirement only applies to newly-established companies, not to long-established ones (Siebert, 1985a) for which grandfatherclauses apply. Regulations cannot be changed rapidly if unexpected pollution arises; for example, the state of the art stipulated in the 1973 Federal German Clean Air Act was not altered until1986.
If environmental risks exist for persistent pollutants, the government's expectations of these risks may be a reason to set stricter quality targets. It can then issue additional permits in the future. If the environment were to deteriorate more than expected, the government might be forced to pay subsidies in order to induce abatement. This would hold true if the institutional setting cannot be changed quickly. If this is the case, the government bears the abatement costs of environmental risks.
In principle, liability law introduces an incentive to improve the technology of abatement into a permit system. However, if emissions arise on a continuous basis in production activities, liability law is difficult to apply. Often, the individual polluter is not known, a specific damage can have many causes, and transaction costs are high. It is hard for the pollutee to provide proof. If strict liability shifts the burden of proof to the polluter, he has to show that damages are not caused by him. If it is correct that there is only a statistical connection between emissions and damages, then this proof cannot usually be successful. I follow Adams (1986) that such a reversal of the burden of proof with continuously arising emissions may lead to an 'excess liability' of the polluter. Emission licences, preferably transferable, or emission taxes may be the relevant policy instrument.
Thus, in the case of activity liability, the existing policy instruments cannot be easily substituted by liability law. A different approach would be to give liability rules a more prominent role in the context of a licensing approach. 3 One way is to apply liability once standards are surpassed. This approach has the disadvantage that technological incentives are not institutionalized within the given standard. Moreover, in setting the standards, the government carries the risk of environmental degradation because standards cannot be easily changed. The more important question is whether arrangements can be found in which liability laws are made more biting without doing away with the licensing approach.
Emission taxes have been used in water-quality management when a continuous flow of pollutants occurs. Emission taxes can also be applied to air pollutants. Levying a tax on emissions discharged into the environment (for instance, per ton of S0 2 ) is designed to correct the discrepancy between individual and social costs. At the same time, an incentive is introduced into the market economy to treat the environment with greater respect. The advantage of emissions taxes is that they define the conditions of the environmental scarcity better and introduce price leverage in order to solve environmental problems. Firms are inspired to devise new methods of abatement. One important condition for introducing emissions taxes is that such a tax can only provide the correct incentive if linked to the amount of emissions, e.g. per ton of S0 2 . A general environment tax such as a forestry levy does not provide any incentive to avoid creating pollutants; such a tax is merely a financing method.
The government bears the costs of correcting environmental deterioration when emissions taxes are imposed if the emissions tax or scarcity price cannot be adjusted quickly in the political process to new scarcity conditions. The discussions surrounding the German Waste Water Act and its introduction have shown that it can take 10 years or more to plan, pass, and enforce such an act. However, a change in scarcity prices must not take such a long time. Arrangements whereby the desired environmental quality is determined by parliament and emissions tax rates by the government, should therefore be considered. Such a solution could entail environmental policy automatically correcting allocations for unforeseen environmental pollution in the form of adjustments to emissions taxes. In such a scenario, the costs of correcting environmental risks would quickly be attributed to the polluter. At the same time, incentives would be introduced to improve environmental quality.
In the case of emission taxes, a similar problem arises as in the licensing process. It is difficult to imagine that liability can dominate the emission taxes because the transaction costs of the liability system will be too high.
Continuously Arising Emissions in Consumption.
When pollutants arise in consumption activities (traffic, heating), it may be difficult to apply emission licences or emission taxes due to extremely high monitoring costs. Then, product norms (for cars, chimneys) tend to be the appropriate policy instrument. Liability law seems to be impracticable, mainly due to the transaction costs. In this case, it is extremely difficult to alter environmental policy if unforeseen environmental disruptions show up. Thus, in the case of emissions from production and consumption, activity liability does not seem to be a too promising approach.
Pollutants Bound in Consumption Goods. When pollutants are contained in consumption goods, they may represent a health hazard to consumers. Liability law would show up in the form of product liability. As a policy instrument, product liability competes with product norms.
Pollutants Bound in Discharged Goods. When pollutants are contained in durable consumption or in investment goods and are returned to the environment when discarded (the icebox with freon), liability law would have to be framed as environmental liability. The problem then is who can go to court in environmental disputes.
Environmental Accidents. When pollutants are discharged into the environment on an accidental basis, as in the Bhopal, Seveso, and Sandoz cases, the effects and the occurrence of an accident are unknown. Consequently, environmental accidents cannot be regulated ex ante because an accident cannot be clearly defined. Accident liability brings out the advantage of liability law.
Vintage Damages. A special problem arising from the liability principle relates to 'old' or historic damages. First, it may no longer be possible to trace the polluters, for instance of the large number of dumps closed at the end of the seventies in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Second, it may no longer be possible to bring polluters to justice because they ceased to exist, for instance, those who exploited lead mines back in the Middle Ages. Vintage liability is not possible.
Notes
1 Economists are used to marginal analyses in the neighbourhood of an equilibrium. If an independent variable is changed a little bit, how is the dependent variable on the system as a whole affected? The natural scientist is acquainted with a phenomenon that a marginal variation may lead to a change in quality, for instance, altering water into vapour.
2 Note that S' here only affects the probability a. It can also be assumed that 57 reduces D as well.
3 I do not see a practical way to introduce liability into the licensing procedure when transaction costs are taken into account.
